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mere historical work to be traced back to sense datum but rather a meeting point in which the human and the divine come together. The language is mystical, experiential, and spiritual. Hedley's masterful mapping of Coleridge's linguistic account dovetails with the speculative
account of the will in a fruitful fashion that I think merits close attention.
Hedley's book is a dense work, closely argued on both historical and
philosophical grounds and will richly repay a close reading. It will
undoubtedly stir controversy among those who, for whatever reasons,
conceive of metaphysics as alien to the gospel or as moribund. Hedley
introduces a rich cast of characters, especially the Cambridge Platonists
and, in particular, Ralph Cudworth. Moving these characters to the
foreground is enriching both as history of philosophy as well as philosophy proper. Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion is a refreshing foray into
speculative metaphysics going full tilt. It is heartening to find a willingness to sort through Platonism with a charitable eye. Hedley turns up
old resources that are under appreciated and offers a fresh current of life
moving within the Neo-Platonic tradition and Trinitarian speculation.
Were a list of worthy Platonic scholars being compiled today, Hedley
might be the next in the line of those "brisk young thinkers rendering
fine things to a reluctant generation." Heartily recommended.

Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues by Alasdair
Macintyre (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1999). ISBN 0-8126-9397-3. Pp. ix166, $26.95 Hard Cover.

NICHOLAS MERIWETHER, Shawnee State University
Those whose familiarity with the work of Alasdair MacIntyre is limited
to his highly influential critique of modern ethical theory, After Virtue, may
be forgiven for finding his recent publication, Dependent Rational Animals
(henceforth: ORA), a somewhat puzzling departure. The reason ORA
would appear to represent such an abrupt change is his assertion in After
Virtue that an account of Aristotelian practical reasoning must relinquish
any reference to a natural telos, or "metaphysical biology." However, in
subsequent works incrementally, and now most emphatically in ORA, he
has fully embraced the view that metaphysics grounded in human biology
is ineliminable from a complete account of the ethical life.
In his rich and provocative work since After Virtue and prior to ORA,
MacIntyre has sought to provide a comprehensive ethical theory and
moral epistemology on the basis of the phenomenon of practical reasoning.
In its Aristotelian embodiment, practical reasoning describes the process
by which the individual pursues goods internal to social practices by
acquiring virtues, e.g., wisdom, honesty, and justice, and orienting action
to those goods virtuously, i.e., in an excellent manner. This process is
inherently social because the novice serves as apprentice to those who have
mastered the practice, though this does not preclude the possibility that the
novice will one day through acquisition of the relevant virtues exceed or
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advance the practice through better reasoning about the achievement of
the goods internal to it.
Now in DRA, Maclntyre examines the implications of practical reasoning for the political1ife of a community, and in so doing, he finds that the
proper understanding of the relationship between the purely biological,
hence metaphysical, needs of our species and the nature of our socialization
into a community as independent, rational actors is essential to a virtuecentered ethic. Maclntyre delineates a central thesis of DRA as follows:
... the virtues that we need, if we are to develop from our initial animal condition into that of independent rational agents, and the
virtues that we need if we are to confront and respond to vulnerability and disability both in ourselves and in others, belong to one and
the same set of virtues, the distinctive virtues of dependent rational
animals, whose dependence, rationality and animality have to be
understood in relation to each other (5).
Thus, the MacIntyre of DRA is concerned with returning a concept of
metaphysical biology to his neo-Aristotelianism. ( Indeed, his return to biological metaphysics radically reduces the need for the qualifying prefix.)
The reasons he cites for the rehlrn have to do with inadequacies and obscurities in his previous non-metaphysical account of practical inquiry that
can only be addressed by taking into consideration our socio-biological
condition, and hence our biological vulnerability. Attending to our biological inter-dependence reveals inter alia that Aristotle was in error to insist
that the man possessing magnanimity "is ashamed when he receives benefits," (Nichomachean Ethics 1124610) since receiving good is proper only to
the inferior person. Rather, the receiving as well as the giving of benefits
(goods) and our acknowledgement of our need for the benefits that only
others can give is central to the acquisition of virtue, and hence to the
moral life.
A constituent feature of DRA is his treatment of the uniqueness of
human reason-giving. At the same time, he avers that like other advanced
animal species, our reasoning cannot be and should not be separated from
our animality. (The indissoluble link between our rationality and our animality on the example of the animal kingdom is the subject of chapters 2.
through 6.) His conclusion is that despite our superior powers of reasoning and justification, "we remain animal selves with animal identities" (49).
But whereas advanced animal species have reasons for communal actions
such as hunting, shelter-building, and mating, human beings are uniquely
capable of evaluating reasons, of deciding, e.g., whether the reasons provided are sufficient to justify the actions taken. In short, by dint of our superior communication skills we are able to provide reasons for our reasons.
According to MacIntyre, this ability makes it incumbent upon us to engage
in socially-shared moral inquiry, since on the one hand, like other animal
species, we need one another to flourish biologically and socially, but in
light of the human capacity (and need) for justifying our reasons for acting,
we must in addition achieve shared agreement as to what constitute good
reasons for acting. For those familiar with Jiirgen Habermas's theory of
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communicative action, there are interesting parallels here with the latter's
insistence that norms are communicatively achieved, with the significant
distinction that Habermas rejects the possibility of consensus about the
nature of the human good in favor of formally procedural norms.
So, because we are biologically and socially inter-dependent, we must
share a range of communal goods, including certain virtues that impel us
to cooperate, to share, and to have concern for others. These virtues, which
we also acquire though our inter-dependence, enable us to achieve the
communally-shared and -justified good, both for ourselves and for others.
Having established that human flourishing is both communal and distinctly rational, MacIntyre then turns to the question of independent reasoning. While the term "independent practical reasoning" suggests for
most contemporary readers a notion of moral autonomy, for MacIntyre, it
refers to "the ability and willingness to evaluate the reasons for action
ad'.'anced to one by others, so that one makes oneself accountable ....
... One cannot then be an independent practical reasoner without being
able to give to others an intelligible account of one's reasoning." (105).
There is unquestionably some circularity in a "social" account of independence so construed. How precisely does our being independent thinkers
require an understanding of social dependence?
He first acknowledges the argument from expedience, viz., that if a person is not in a communal network of giving (care) and receiving (benefits),
then that person can have no confidence that others will provide the care
he needs at times of illness or injury, and such uncertainty in the light of
the vagaries of human existence necessarily inhibit the practice of critical
inquiry. But the requirement that I continually have for others to care for
my urgent need should it arise does not bear significantly upon my acquiring the communal virtues of independent practical reasoning wherein I see
my own good and the good of the community as one and the same. It is
after all merely a consideration from strategic self-interest that 1 care for
others because 1 may require their care for me.
But if we view independent practical reasoning as "essentially social,"
that is, that one cannot come to know one's own good without undertaking
critical inquiry with others, we can see that the sort of relationship one
would have to have with other persons must to some extent be characterized by virtues that enable him to seek out and accept criticism from others,
viz., truthfulness, mutual recognition, and openness to refutation, what
MacIntyre refers to as the "communicative virtues" (156, 161). And the way
the individual acquires these inquiry-friendly virtues is characteristically by
realizing his dependence upon the sacrifices of others for his health, his
education, his safety, etc. Moreover, he is best able to appreciate the sacrifices others have made to his well-being, and also to overcome his natural
shallowness and self-regard, through a proper concern and care for those
who are dependent upon him, i.e., the infirm, the injured, and the ill (136-7).
Besldes the communicative virtues, the virtues that make the proper care
and concern possible include the unique virtue of just generosity, along
witll more familiar virtues such as pity (misericordia) and benevolence.
lhus, the basic idea is that in order to become an independent practical
rea~oner, one must acquire certain virhles, and it is only possible to acquire
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these virtues if he is in relationships of giving and receiving with a distinct
community sharing a vision of the common good (since one cannot inquire
collectively about the good without a common vision of the good). Most
importantly, proper concern for those who are ill, infirm, or mentally
handicapped will issue in political engagement, since the independent
practical reasoner is aware that the good of those with whom he shares
relationships of giving and receiving requires more than what any immediate family can provide.
I suggest it does not tax the imagination to see how MacIntyre's account
of rational practical inquiry would, if sOlmd, contribute significantly to the
deliberative virtues necessary for a democratic political order. Fairness,
open-mindedness, tolerance, inclusiveness, and even the readiness to
engage in political affairs are all as it were by-products of the process by
which the individual grows into a citizen who is at once giving, nurturing,
and capable of independent practical reasoning. Most importantly, in contrast to justifications for political engagement based upon strategic selfinterest individualistically conceived, the goal of this reasoning is necessarily the greater good. Unless one is virtuous in the acknowledged-dependence sense, he cannot find the moral good for himself, and unless this good
is one that is shared, it is in fact not the good. Moral commitments are hence
not external to the process of critical inquiry, but constitutive of it (162).
This addition to MacIntyre's already-significant corpus is, like much of
his work, arresting and infinitely suggestive, but there remain serious
problems. For the sake of space, I will only outline one such problem, having to do with the nature of benevolence. Perhaps the more serious problem has to do with reconciling the realism assumed in his metaphysical
biology with the tradition-bound epistemology developed in his previous
work, but an adequate treatment of this would require more space than is
available in a short book review.
Maclntyre distinguishes between what he calls the virtue of just generosity and the vice of altruism by casting the latter as based upon a misconception of human beings as divided in their inclinations between self-regarding
and other-regarding inclinations (160). In the altruist, other-regarding inclinations prevail and issue in self-sacrificial acts. This is flawed because on an
Aristotelian understanding, the individual acquires the virtue of just generosity, which inter alia informs him that the good of his community just is
his good, and thus his actions for the sake of others are always at the same
time actions for himself. Acting against the good of one's community, and
by extension one's own good, is thus unjust. This uniting of individual with
the common good is often observable in immediate family members, and
one can at least envisage how this uniting can obtain as well for a small
community, say the members of a religious sect or the inhabitants of an
extremely close-knit fishing or farming community.
Moreover, that communal networks of genuine giving and receiving are
necessarily small entails that the collective pursuit of a common good is
out of the question for the nation-state. Hence the insistence on local communities as the source of the good can more effectively account for the
need for neutrality on the part of the nation-state regarding the communities within its borders. In other words, the nation-state would merely pro-
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teel from harm or danger its diverse communities of giving-and-receiving
without privileging or adopting the good of any particular one. According
to MacIntyre, when the nation-state attempts to formulate or impose a
vision of the good on its diverse communities, it makes the "commLmitarian mistake" of "infus[ing] the politics of the state with the values and
modes of participation in local community" (142). MacIntyre thus restricts
the goods of the nation-state to public security, for "the shared public
goods of the modem nation-state are not the common goods of a genuine
nation-wide community." The extension of the goods of "kinship and
locality" to the entire population produces what MacIntyre ominously
refers to as the fiction of a Volk, which is characteristically "an ideological
disguise for sinister realities" (132).
But herein lies the problem for a community-generated ethic: What of
large-scale social movements which require a concern not just for those living within one's community, but for those who are both geographically,
culturally, and ethnically outside of that community? Here one can cite the
anb-slavery and civil rights movements, or the pro-life movement as examples. What seems to have motivated activists in these exemplary causes is
less a communally-motivated notion of the good as a conception of a moral
obligation to human beings as such, one which holds regardless of the fact
that those they sought to help were alien to their community.
Here MacIntyre has recourse to the virtue of misericordia. Misericordia
"has regard to urgent and extreme need without respect of persons," it is,
in short, the virtue of "humanity" extending assistance and goodwill to all
per:~ons as such (123-4). Elsewhere, MacIntyre speaks of need as providing
sufficient justification for action, but in context this applies only to an
emphatically local community (108).
How then does misericordia provide the needed justification for moral
action outside of one's community boundaries? Since the "just good" for
MacIntyre must be tied to the community and ultimately back to the individual, his first argument relies on the transparency of community boundaries, i.e., that we are often in more than one community, and we typically
move in and out of them over the course of a lifetime. Secondly, since we
can always find ourselves in a position in which we require care appropriate to our need and not to our status or desert, we can only rely on others
within our communities to the extent that they exhibit the virtue of misericordia. So because of the demands of communal flourishing, we must recognize in the alien someone whom we should call "neighbor" or "friend,"
and thus someone whose good is indissolubly linked with "ours and
mine." Indeed, according to Aquinas, misericordia "may on occasion be
rightly judged to outweigh the claims of familial or other immediate social
ties" (125).
I suggest, however, that the attempt to stretch the good of the community to include the alien or stranger is deeply problematic. First, the rational
justtfication for giving charitable assistance is ultimately shifted from the
good of the recipient to the good of the giver and his community, and this
places severe limits on charity. But this is of course MacIntyre's point in
contrasting the virtue of just generosity with altruism, viz., it is unjust to be
overly generous, and overly generous is defined as those acts of generosity
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that do not redound to the good of my community and by extension to me.
So while it is no doubt true that in order for me to feel secure that the members of my commlmity will react appropriately to my urgent need, I would
need to see them express this generosity toward the alien or stranger in our
geographical midst, I would not need to see them act this way toward the
needy living at any sort of distance to have this security. Tn fact, as an
independent practical reasoner, I might reasonably fear that too much concern for such persons will detract from the quality of care I might receive
were I to require it.
Now it may be argued that the virtue of misericordia qua disposition to
act in such-and-such a manner will of itself issue in charitable acts toward
those located spatially and culturally outside my immediate community as
a kind of contingent feature of having the virtue. We might refer to this
phenomenon as "the spill-over effect," i.e., a virtue intended specifically
for purpose (x) cannot really serve that purpose unless it applies to all
instances relevantly similar though not identica I to (x). Moreover,
MacIntyre points out that in order to express the virtues of just generosity
and misericordia appropriately, the charitable person acts to meet the
needs of others without calculation (159). Let us grant to MacIn.tyre that
the expression of a virtue, which according to Aristotle is constituted by
reason (Nichomachean Ethics 1l07a), can nevertheless be exercised on occasion without deliberation or calculation. Perhaps the reason for this lies in
the fact that one initially acquires the habit to act in such-and-such a manner by consideration of the mean, but will eventually act habitually and
thus no longer with calculation. Notwithstanding the fact that the exercise
of virtue can be without deliberative reason, however, the exercise of
virtue cannot be contrary to reason. And to the degree that virtues are dispositions to act excellently, and excellence is defined by a localized communitarian understanding of the good, actions based upon neither the
common good nor upon my good are in fact "altruistic," and thus vices
(160). Moreover, mv concern that these non-communal acts of misericordia may redound to~my harm is indeed warranted under the communallyrestricted conditions of justice. The only wayan act of misericordia can be
directed toward those outside my local community and be part of my own
good is if the communal good somehow extends to the whole of
humankind. But this goes so far beyond any sort of concrete, flesh-andblood network of giving and receiving within a context of a communallyshared notion of the good that it is hard to properly designate it
Aristotelian, as Maclntyre defines it.
A solution to this problem may lie in other features of MacIntyre's
work. Whereas early in his accounts of practical reasoning, he refused any
sort of support through metaphysics or natural law, by the early '90's, he
had begun to view a teleological ethic as necessitating not only metaphysical claims, but theistic metaphysical claims. The story of the person who
achieves his good is one that can only make sense if the achievement of the
good is in fact true and not merely a story, "but such explanations will be
true if and only if the universe itself is teleologically ordered, and the only
type of teleologically ordered universe in which we have good reason to
believe is a theistic universe" (The Macintyre Reader, Kelvin Knight, ed.

390

Faith and Philosophy

Notre Dame, 1998, p. 152). The traditional conceptions of theism, based as
they are on the book of Genesis, contain within them the seeds of a universal love, one which extends one's understanding of what sort of person is
to be the object of my benevolence to all of humankind based upon each
person's possession of the imago dei, and not just upon the contingent features of virtues I require for flourishing. For Christians, the parable of the
Good Samaritan underscores that it is the enemy I encounter along the
way, and not just the stranger happening into my community, that is the
object of virtuous neighborliness. TI.us, while one could make the case for
placing normative priority upon family and friends in most instances, the
reach of misericordia extends to the entire community of divine imagebearers, and can necessitate departure from if not harm to that local community, as is the case with a Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a Mother Teresa, or a
William Carey.

Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca and London, 1999. Pp.xi + 220. No price given.
BRlAN DAVIES, Fordham University
If there is a problem of evil, how should we state it? And how should we
deal with it? A common line of thinking holds that the problem is either a
logical or an evidentialist one, that it can be summarized by questions like
"em we consistently believe both in the reality of Cod and in the reality of
evil?" or " Does evil render God's existence improbable or unlikely?" But
how should we engage with the problem of evil considered in these terms?
One way would be to start with a definition of the word "God" and with
one or more premises concerning what the definition entails when it comes
to what might or might not be expected in a world made by God. One
might then seek to show either that evil is impossible or unlikely in such a
world (our world), or that it is possible or even positively explicable.
Yet what should we take "God" to mean? And what premises might
we subsequently invoke so as to challenge or defend belief in God's existence? For many contemporary philosophers "God" means "an all-powerful. all-knowing, morally impeccable person who will always prevent evil
if morally obliged to do so and if able to do so". Much recent discussion of
the problem of evil has therefore been concerned with suggesting that God
either lacks or has morally sufficient reason for permitting the evil that
occurs. Evil, so it is frequently said, is of two kinds: moral (the morally bad
choices of created agents, together with their consequences) and natural
(nalurally occurring states or processes of an undesirable kind). To some
philosophers it seems that both moral and natural evil could have no place
in a world governed by an all-powerful. all-knowing morally impeccable
person (the conclusion being that God cannot or probably does not exist). To
others it seems either that evil is not demonstrably incompatible with the
existence of such a person, or that such a person has good moral reason for
permitting it (the conclusion being either that evil and God are compossi-

